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INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the Internet had not been invented, web sites did not exist, and
lawyer marketing was essentially unknown. Yet a 1973 letter from a South

Carolina lawyer offering help to a sterilized woman would lead to a United
States Supreme Court decision recognizing important First Amendment
principles that today limit the power of states to regulate lawyer web sites.
In re Primus' concerned South Carolina's attempt to punish lawyer Edna

*Member and Secretary-Treasurer, Thomas & LoCicero PL, Tampa. Florida. My thanks to my
colleague James J. McGuire for his comments on an early draft of this article and to South Carolina
ChiefJustice Jean Hoefer Toal, for her comments concerning In re Primus,436 U.S. 412 (1978), during
the opening reception for this symposium.
1. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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Smith Primus for advising Mary Etta Williams of her legal rights and the
availability of legal assistance through the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU).2 Newspapers had been reporting at the time that South Carolina women
had been sterilized "as a condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance
under the Medicaid program."3 Primus's letter stated that "[t]he American Civil
Liberties Union would like to file a lawsuit on your behalf for money against the
doctor who performed the operation.. 4 "We will be coming to Aiken in the near
future and would like to explain what is involved," Primus wrote.5 The letter
continued, "[1]f you are interested, let me know, and I'll let you know when we
will come down to talk to you about it." 6
At the time that Primus wrote this letter, South Carolina's rules governing
lawyers prohibited "knowingly assist[ing] a person or organization that
recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services [in order] to promote the use
of [the lawyer's] services or those of [the lawyer's] partners or associates., 7 A
panel of South Carolina's lawyer disciplinary board concluded that Primus
violated that rule by attempting to solicit a potential client for the ACLU, for
which an associate of Primus was staff counsel.8 The panel also found Primus
violated another rule-DR 2-104(A)(5)-because she encouraged the potential
client to join in a prospective class action that was to be brought by the ACLU.9
Sanctioning Primus, the disciplinary board argued, served the state's interests in
"the prevention of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of
privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference and other evils that are thought to
inhere generally in solicitation by lawyers of prospective clients."' 1
South Carolina's attempt to serve those interests by sanctioning Primus, the
Supreme Court found, was unconstitutionally broad and violated Primus's rights
to freedom of speech and association. 1 Primus's letter clearly communicated an
offer to provide legal assistance, and in discussing her letter the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that a state could regulate lawyer solicitation
activity "that 'simply propose[s] a commercial transaction."",12 "In the context of
political expression and association, however, a State must regulate with
significantly greater precision," the Court held. 3 As a result, the Court rejected

2. See id at 415-16, 421.
3. Id. at 415.
4. Id. at 416 n.6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.at 418 n. 10 (quoting S.C. DR 2-103(D)). For similar versions of Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)
and commentary on the multiple amendments to that rule, see ANNOTATED CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) (1979).
8. Id.at 420-21.
9. Id.at 421.
10. Id.at 432.
11. See id.
at433. 39.
12. Id. at 437 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
13. Id.at 437-38.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/11

2

Lake: Speaking Legally and Freely: Lawyers, Web Sites, and the First Am

2007]

LAWYERS, WEB SITES, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

South Carolina's sanction of Primus for "her actions ... undertaken to express
personal political beliefs."14
The Primus decision, therefore, provides considerable protection for written
communications advising members of the public of their legal rights. That is
precisely the content of many legal service providers' web sites today.
Consequently, this Article argues, states must not seek to regulate web sites
broadly with the same onerous regulations that some states apply to traditional
print and television advertising. Instead, lawyer web pages that do not consist of
pure advertising content are entitled to full constitutional protection.
11.

LAWYER WEB SITES ARE WIDESPREAD AND SIGNIFICANT

At first glance, the subject of lawyers' web sites might seem a fairly narrow
topic, of interest only to law firm marketing staffs. But in fact law firms, like all
industries and professions, are part of the Internet revolution. In 1994, only "five
American law firms had web pages."'" "Today, almost all large law firms and
many small firms and solo practitioners have web sites."16 As the president of
The Florida Bar has noted, the Internet has dramatically changed the way
lawyers communicate.17 Specifically, he wrote, "Florida has traveled from the
isolated advertising lawyer of the mid-1970s to massive, sophisticated marketing
which the Bar struggles to address, including the regulation of Web sites.
Tension between legitimate commercial speech and the protection of the public
intensifies as never before."' 8 No doubt the same could be said of the bars of
South Carolina and every other state.
III.

LAWYER WEB SITES ARE NOT NECESSARILY COMMERCIAL SPEECH

But lawyers' web sites are not merely "legitimate commercial speech," to
use The Florida Bar president's words. 9 Since the Primus decision, the United
States Supreme Court has on many occasions reiterated that commercial speech
means communication "proposing a commercial transaction."2 Presumably,
therefore, the legitimate commercial speech that the president of The Florida Bar
had in mind was a web page on which a lawyer overtly urges potential clients to
retain him and to pay a fee for his assistance with a particular legal

14. Id. at 421-22.
15. Jeffrey E. Kirkey, Legal Ethics in Cyberspace: Keeping Lawyers and Their Computers out
of Trouble, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37. 46-47 (2001).
16. J. T. Westermeier, Ethics and the Internet, 17 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 267, 269-70 (2004).
17. See Henry M. Coxe II, Finding Time to Face the issues, 80 FLA. BAR J. 6, 6 (2006).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525. 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,562 (1980)); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 482 (1995) (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410. 422 (1993); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989).
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problem speech genuinely proposing a commercial transaction. And no doubt
some law firm web content fits within this definition. Web pages that overtly
urge clients to pay particular lawyers for assistance with specific matters likely
fit within the definition of commercial speech. Certainly regulators of lawyer
speech have at times treated such web pages as simply a form of traditional
lawyer advertising in another medium."
But the fact that some speech on lawyer web sites is commercial does not
mean all lawyer speech transmitted through that medium is commercial.
Lawyers use the Internet to post scholarly articles,22 to discuss the status of
pending cases,23 to discuss developments in particular substantive areas of the
law," to report major court decisions, 2 5 and to speak on any number of subjects
without ever proposing to provide a particular legal service to a particular client
for a fee. Consequently, much of the speech on lawyer web sites falls outside of
the Supreme Court's basic definition of commercial speech.
The web site is the medium; it is not the message. To say that certain speech
occurs in public parks does not tell us the level of First Amendment protection
that applies. Some speech in public parks is commercial.26 Some speech in
public parks is not commercial. 2 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized
in a plurality opinion, "mere physical characteristics of the property [where
speech occurs] cannot dictate forum analysis."28 Similarly, a report concerning
recent Fourth Circuit decisions or alerting members of the public to their legal

21. See Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Bjorklund, 725 N.W.2d 1. 6 (Iowa
2006) (sanctioning a lawyer for claims on a web site that his firm's "'scholarly achievements are
unmatched by any other law firm,'" that the lawyer is "'the foremost authority on drunk driving
defense,"' and that the firm's "zealous and aggressive legal representation has resulted in
overwhelmingly favorable results for clients,'" because the statements violated an Iowa rule prohibiting
public communications that "are false, deceptive, unfair or unverifiable.... [O]r which contain any
statement or claim relating to the quality of the lawyer's services" (quoting IOWA CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (repealed 2005))); In re Richmond's Case, 872 A.2d 1023, 1029 (N.H.
2005) (concluding a lawyer's claim on his web site of "expertise in financing and raising capital" was
a misrepresentation because the lawyer "did not have any special training or experience in securities
law"); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 754 N.E.2d 219, 225, 231 32 (Ohio 2001) (holding
attorney's web site claim to be "[a] passionate and aggressive advocate" violated a rule prohibiting
unverifiable self-laudatory statements).
22. See, e.g., Frederick Dorwart, Lawyers, Articles, http://www.fdlaw.com/articles.cfm (last
visited June 17, 2007).
23. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Litigation Group, www.citizen.org/litigation (last visited June 17.
2007).
24.
See, e.g., Partly Cloudy: Florida's Sunshine and Public Records Laws,
http://floridasunshinelaw.blogspot.com/ (last visited June 17, 2007).
25. See, e.g., McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, Client Alert: Supreme Court Decides the Cleveland
PredatoryLending OrdinanceCase. Dec. 6,2006, http://gcmba.net/ClientAlertl206O6.pdf(last visited
June 17, 2007).
26. See, e.g., Infinity Outdoor, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 165 F. Supp. 2d 403,405, 414 15 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (applying commercial speech analysis to a zoning regulation of signs near highways and public
parks).
27. See, e.g., Barnett v. D'Artois, 331 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (W.D. La. 1971) (applying First
Amendment protections for political speech in a public park).
28. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720. 727 (1990) (O'Connor. J.. plurality opinion).
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rights is not commercial speech merely because the report appears on a law
firm's web site. The fact that a message is communicated via a web site does not
determine that the speech is commercial; such a rule would understate the
constitutional protection that is potentially applicable to such communication.
Because lawyers use web sites to do much more than propose commercial
transactions, lawyers'
web sites are not merely-or even
necessarily-commercial speech.29 Consequently, the power states have to
regulate commercial speech generally does not extend to the noncommercial
content of lawyer web sites.
IV.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH

Labeling speech commercial or noncommercial is significant because, of
course, the First Amendment grants noncommercial speech a much greater level
of protection than commercial speech. The Supreme Court has given
considerable deference to state efforts to regulate commercial speech, most
notably in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission. ° And to be sure, Central Hudson's deferential standard has been
applied to traditional lawyer advertising.3' But the CentralHudson standard does
not apply to web sites that discuss legal, political, or social topics.
For example, in CPC International,Inc. v. Skippy Inc.,32 the Fourth Circuit
applied "full First Amendment protection"3 3 to speech on a cartoonist's web site

29. Some communication that does not merely propose a commercial transaction might be
considered commercial if that speech is part of an advertisement that refers to a specific product or
service and the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 67 & n.13 (1983) (addressing whether pamphlets that a manufacturer of
contraceptives produced that referred to the manufacturer's products either specifically or generically
were commercial speech); see also Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.. 134 F.3d 87.
90, 94 n.2, 97 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding a brewery's proposed beer label depicting "a frog with the second
of its four unwebbed 'fingers' extended in a manner evocative of a well known human gesture of insult"
was commercial speech because this "depiction of an insolent frog" or "afrog behaving badly" was "a
form of advertising, identiflied] a specific product, and serve[d] the economic interest of the speaker").
Primus precludes application of this broad definition of commercial speech to a lawyer's web page
speech "undertaken to express personal political beliefs." See 436 U.S. 412,422 (1978); see also United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 226 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "our
Nation's deep commitment to 'safeguarding academic freedom' and to the 'robust exchange of ideas"'
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589. 603 (1967)).
Consequently, any political, scholarly, or journalistic content of a lawyer's web site is protected from
regulation as mere commercial speech.
30. 447 U.S. at 564-65 (1980) (describing how the government must assert substantial interest
in support of its regulation, demonstrate that the restriction directly and materially advances that
interest, and demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly drawn to service a First Amendment
Challenge).
31. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 471 U.S. 626. 629-31, 638 (1985)
(indicating the Court would apply CentralHudson to newspaper advertisements stating that a lawyer
would represent clients in certain matters for a fee).
32. 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000).
33. Id. at 462.
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that included criticism of a company with which the cartoonist had been in
litigation.34 "The web site served a primarily informational purpose, not a
commercial one," the Fourth Circuit found.35 Similarly, in Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp.,36 the Ninth Circuit applied "'full First Amendment
protection' ''37 to a web site containing links to sites that offered disparaging
commentary concerning an auto maker." And, in 2004, a California Court of
Appeal found that the Planned Parenthood organizations' web sites providing
medical information were not commercial and were entitled to "full First
Amendment protection,"39 even though the sites included a telephone number40
that could be used by persons seeking an appointment for medical services.
Similarly, state regulation of lawyers' web sites is not entitled to Central
Hudson's deferential treatment at least to the extent that the web sites do more
than merely offer a lawyer's services for a fee.
V.

PROBLEMS WITH TREATING LAWYER WEB SITES AS COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The difficulties of regulating lawyer web sites have been front and center in
Florida. In January 2007, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar considered
tightening regulations concerning lawyer web sites.4 Under regulations in effect
at that time, Florida lawyers' web sites were subject to a generally applicable
prohibition on "false, misleading, deceptive or unfair communication. ' , 42 In
addition, Florida lawyers were required to disclose on their web sites attorney
admission information and office locations.43 Without any specific evidence that
such requirements had proven insufficient, the Board of Governors contemplated
subjecting web sites to the more onerous requirements that apply to television
and traditional print advertising. 4 Those forms of advertising must be submitted
to bar officials for review "either prior to or concurrently with the lawyer's first
dissemination of the advertisement., 45 In addition, television advertisements
must not contain "any spokesperson's voice or image that is recognizable to the
public" or "any background sound other than instrumental music., 46 And print
and television ads must not contain testimonials, 47 "any reference to past success

34. Id. at 460-62.
35. Id.at 462.
36. 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004)
37. Id. at 1017 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002)).
38. Id.at 1008, 1015.
39. Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 215 (Ct. App. 2004).
40. Id. at217.
41. See Gary Blankenship. Board Takes New Tack on Lawyer Web Sites: Proposal ncludes Some
Lawyer Ad Rules Exemptions with Disclaimers,FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at 1.
42. See FLA. BAR R. 4-7.2(b)( 1) (West 2006).
43. See id. 4-7.6(b)(1)-(2).
44. See Blankenship, supra note 41.
45. See FLA. BAR. R. 4-7.7(a).
46. See id.
4-7.5(b)(1)(B)-(C).
47. Id. 4-7.2(b)(1)(E).
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or results obtained" by the lawyer,48 and "statements describing or characterizing
the quality of the lawyer's services."49 The Florida Board of Governors also
considered restricting access to law firm web sites so that one would have to
establish a prior relationship with a firm and obtain a password as a prerequisite
to access portions of the site. ° Regulating law firm web sites in this
manner-that is, by restricting access, requiring law firms to submit web site
content for regulatory review, or prohibiting speech by lawyers concerning their
prior cases is remarkably bad public policy, is simply unworkable, and is
unconstitutional.
VT.

POLICY REASONS FOR REJECTING ONEROUS REGULATION OF LAWYER WEB
SITES

Onerous regulation of web sites is bad policy because lawyers ought to be
encouraged to use their web sites to discuss legal developments with other
lawyers, clients, and the public. Such discussion advances legal scholarship and
the development of our profession. To facilitate such communication, it is
important that lawyers, law students, and law professors-in Florida and
elsewhere-have easy access to one another's writings. A rule requiring users to
obtain passwords, sign in to a law firm's web site, or take other additional steps
to access legal content will deter communication. Computer users are
understandably wary of sites that require user information as a precondition for
access. Likewise, a requirement that lawyers submit web content for bar
approval would take away one of the Internet's key virtues-the ability to
disseminate information quickly. If a lawyer must await regulatory approval
before posting commentary on a United States Supreme Court decision, that
lawyer's analysis will be stale by the time the regulators approve the publication.
The scholarship and qualifications of lawyers ought not be hidden behind such
barriers.
VII.PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH HEAVY REGULATION OF LAWYER WEB SITES

Access limits would not only deter scholarship and commentary. Such rules
also would be difficult to implement. Internet technology changes constantly.
Consequently, it is unclear how access restrictions might impact search engine
results. For example, suppose a law professor in South Carolina is studying law
enforcement compliance with Brady v. Maryland."' The professor might use a
popular search engine, such as Google or Yahoo!, to identify web publications
discussing Brady. Such a search would identify a wide range of results,

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. 4-7.2(b)(1)(B).
Id. 4-7.2(b)(3).
See Blankenship, supra note 41.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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including a Federal Judicial Center article, 52 a page from the Los Angeles
District Attorney's web site,53 and an article from a Texas-based law firm.54 This
sort of open communication ought to be encouraged. And yet under the access
restrictions contemplated in Florida, if a criminal defense lawyer were to write
an article about Brady and mention a case in which that lawyer participated, the
lawyer would have been prohibited from
posting the article on a publicly
55
available portion of the lawyer's firm site.
Such regulation of lawyer web sites would raise a host of complex
questions. If the lawyer gave a copy of the article to his law school, would the
lawyer be subject to discipline if the school posted the article on its publicly
accessible web site with a link to the lawyer's firm site? If the article is on an
access-restricted portion of the firm's site, would search engines such as Google
or Yahoo! be able to find his article? How would the access restrictions be
applied to Florida lawyers whose firms operate in multiple states? Would such a
lawyer be disciplined if his firm's out-of-state marketing staff posted his article
on a public portion of his firm's site? Would the access rules apply to discussion
groups edited by law professors who are active members of The Florida Bar?
These complex questions would no doubt make enforcing access restrictions
extremely difficult.
The volume of lawyer web sites also would present significant problems in
states such as Florida that require lawyers to submit mass media print and
television advertising for regulatory review. 5 6 Florida's pre-2007 rule governing
computer-accessed communications by lawyers purported to regulate any
"information regarding a lawyer's or law firm's services. '' 57 That language could
be read quite broadly as applying, for example, to any article in which a lawyer
merely mentions a case in which the lawyer participated. If states were to apply
existing review requirements developed for print and television advertisements
to all such materials including constantly changing Internet
publications regulators would be inundated with content. Surely those who
regulate the legal profession can find better ways to spend their time than
regulating-or defending the regulation of-legal commentary. States do not

52.

E.g., LAURAL L. HOOPER. JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,

TREATMENT OF BRAI)y v. MARYLANI) MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS'

RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES I (2004), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdflnsf/lookup/BradyMat.pdt7

$file/BradyMat.pdf
53. E.g., Brady Protocol, Special Directive 02-08 (L.A. County Dist. Attorney's Office Dec. 7.
2002), http://da.co.la.ca.us/sd02-08.htm.
54.
E.g., Musick & Musick LLP, Brady Materials and Impeachment Evidence.
http://www.musicklawoffice.com/legal-articles/brady-materials.html (last visited June 17. 2007).
55. See FLA. BARR. 4-7.2(b)( 1)(B) (West 2006) (prohibiting "any reference to past successes or
results obtained"); Blankenship, supranote 41 (citing the view of The Florida Bar's president-elect that
"attorneys should not be able to use testimonials, refer to past results, or characterize the quality of their
legal services" on lawyer web sites "because similar things cannot be done on TV and other types of
ads").
56. See FLA. BAR R. 4-7.7(a).
57. Id. 4-7.6(a).
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require lawyers to submit to regulators letters that are sent to individual potential
clients, even though such letters undoubtedly mention lawyers' previous
experience and past successes.58 The case has not been made to treat web content
differently than individual letters. If that case is made, states had better beef up
their regulatory staffs considerably.
VIII.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRECLUDES HEAVY REGULATION OF LAWYER
WEB SITES

In addition to these practical problems, application of content-based rules to
web site news articles or commentary would raise serious constitutional
concerns. "[A] State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional
misconduct, ignore constitutional rights." 9 Accordingly, although courts have
allowed regulation of genuine lawyer advertising," courts have been much less
tolerant of regulation of speech concerning newsworthy, academic, social, or
political matters, even if that speech is communicated in a medium customarily
occupied by advertising.61 To the extent that web site rules would apply to legal
news or commentary simply because that material appears on a lawyer's web
site, the rules will be ripe for a constitutional challenge-particularly rules that
go beyond prohibitions on deceptive and misleading speech to prohibit speech
that offends the dignity of the profession.62
Constitutional concerns arise not only because of lawyers' free speech
rights, but also because the First Amendment protects the public's right to
receive information. Regulation of lawyers' web sites rests on the assumption
that members of the public are too unsophisticated to recognize puffery. The

58. See, e.g, id 4-7.9(b).
59. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415. 439 (1963).
60. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629-31, 655 (1985)
(addressing newspaper advertisements stating that a lawyer would represent clients in certain matters
for a fee and finding the rule prohibiting deceptive advertising by lawyers survived First Amendment
challenge).
61. See, e.g.. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.. 515 U.S. 618. 634 (1995) ("There are circumstances
in which we will accord speech by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the
strongest protection our Constitution has to offer."); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494
(1995) ("[A] piece ofnewsworthy information on the cover ofa magazine. or abookreview on the back
of a book's dust jacket. is entitled to full constitutional protection") (Stevens. J., concurring): In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1979) (applying the "'exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core
First Amendment rights' to a state's attempt to punish a lawyer who sought to further political and
ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, and advised a lay person of legal
rights and availability of legal assistance (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 44-45 (1976))).
62. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (finding a statute aimed at protecting the dignity
of foreign officials by banning on protests within 500 feet of foreign embassies violated the First
Amendment): Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829. 841-42 (1978) ("Our prior cases
have firmly established ... that injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason 'for repressing
speech that would otherwise be free.' The remaining interest sought to be protected, the institutional
reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the constitutional scales." (quoting N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 272 (1964))).
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Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a "highly paternalistic approach" to
advertising.63 Interrupting the free flow of information from lawyers to their
colleagues and the public is simply patronizing and gives too little value to the
public's interest in the free flow of information from lawyers to their potential
clients.
Finally, access restrictions on web site content are simply unnecessary. One
often-cited rationale for regulating lawyer advertising is that such speech might
intrude upon the seclusion and solitude of persons in mourning or recovering
from physical injury.64 Concern over such intrusion is inapplicable in the context
of web sites. By performing an Internet search and selecting a link to a law
firm's web site, the user has already implicitly requested information from the
firm. As a member of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar explained,
"[p]eople search the Web for specific things. A consumer who searches the Web
for an attorney ... I believe by definition ... is [requesting] information .... ,15
The rules governing Florida lawyers have for years recognized that information
a potential client requests is not subject to the onerous regulation applicable to
traditional print advertising.66 Instead, Florida ethics rules merely require that
such solicited communications be truthful and not misleading and, in some
circumstances, include certain fee-related information. 6 Consequently, requiring
the user to take additional steps would be redundant. The fact that individuals
access web sites through searches or domain names prevents the problems of
intrusiveness or overreaching that can arise if a lawyer uses the telephone or inperson visits to solicit potential clients.68
For all of these reasons, legal services web sites ought not be subject to the
painstaking regulation that some states apply to lawyer newspaper and television
advertising. Whether regulators will act accordingly is, to some degree, an open
question. The Florida Bar's Board of Governors has tentatively placed some

63. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.. 425 U.S. 748. 770, 771
(1976) (rejecting ban on pharmacy price advertising); accordBolgerv. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 70-72 (1983) (rejecting federal effort to ban potentially "offensive" and "intrusive" direct mail
advertisements for contraceptives, and noting that "[r]ecipients of objectionable mailings . . . may
'effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes"' (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980))); Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 97 (1977) (rejecting a ban on "for sale" signs on residential
property enacted because of fear such signs would drive down property values).
64. See, e.g.. Went For It. 515 U.S. at 625 (quoting The Florida Bar's argument that "intrusion
upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families" is "universally regarded as
deplorable and beneath common decency.").
65. See Blankenship. supra note 41 (quoting Florida Bar Board of Governors member Harold
Melville).
66. See FLA. BAR R. 4-7.9(b) (West 2006).
67. See id. 4-7.9.
68. Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n, 436 U.S. 447,454-57 (1978) (distinguishing "solicitation
of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication" from newspaper advertising and
upholding regulation of the former but noting that First Amendment protection of the latter); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (distinguishing "in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain" from an
attorney's letter).
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burdens on web sites, such as requiring disclaimers that indicate results in cases
discussed on the sites might not be typical.69 Application of this compelled
7
speech provision to noncommercial speech would likely be unconstitutional. 1
But fortunately Florida has otherwise stopped short of applying the state's
onerous rules for print and television advertising to web sites.
Likewise, New York regulators have tightened that state's regulation of
speech concerning legal services. Amendments to New York's advertising rules
took effect in early 2007, including a web site disclaimer requirement similar to
Florida's. 7 The amendments to New York's advertising rules are already being
challenged by a personal injury law firm and by the legal services organization
Public Citizen.72 Fortunately, New York regulators did not adopt some more
intrusive regulations that the Federal Trade Commission had criticized as likely
to frustrate consumer choice and to increase the costs of legal services.
IX. CONCLUSION

As the New York and Florida examples illustrate, state regulators are
imposing new requirements on legal services web sites. Primus teaches that such
speech is not necessarily commercial for purposes of the First Amendment.
Scholarly articles, case comments, and legislative summaries on web sites ought
not be treated the same as web pages overtly urging an injured person to retain
the sponsoring law firm for a fee. Therefore, sweeping new rules regulating legal

69. Blankenship, supra note 41 (quoting the disclaimer The Florida Bar Board of Governors
adopted: "Not all results are provided, the results are not necessarily representative of results obtained
by the lawyer, and a prospective client's individual facts and circumstances may differ from the matter
in which the results are provided."); Board of Governors, Florida Bar, The ProposedAttorney Web Site
Advertising Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at I.
70. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1990) (holding that states must not compel
lawyer political speech through use of mandatory bar association dues to pay for ideological activities
unrelated to the bar's purposes; a state might lawfully require its lawyers to pay for programs germane
to regulating the legal profession or to improving legal services in the state, but must not compel bar
members to fund unrelated political activities such as support for "a gun control or nuclear weapons
freeze initiative"): Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (rejecting a Florida
compelled speech statute); Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
individual liberty interests guarded by the First Amendment, which may be impaired when personal or
political speech is mandated by the state, are not ordinarily implicated by compelled commercial
[speech]." (citations omitted)). See generally James B. Lake. Note, Lawyers, Please Check Your First
Amendment Rights at the Bar: The Problem of State-MandatedBar Dues and Compelled Speech, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1833 (1993) (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding state bar associations
and compelled speech).
71. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.6(E)(3) (2007).
72. See Complaint at 1, 12, Alexander v. Cahill, No. 5:07-cv-001 17-FJS-GHL (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
1, 2007) (alleging, inter alia, that domain name regulation "affects even web pages that are totally
unrelated to the lawyer's practice of law").
73. See Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Director, Office of Policy Planning, Lydia B. Parnes.
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Michael A. Salinger, Director, Bureau of Economics, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Michael Colodner, Counsel, N.Y. Office of Court Adm. I (Sept. 14,2006), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/09/VO60020-image.pdf.
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services web sites will likely violate the First Amendment, unduly burden noncommercial speech, and hamper legal scholarship. To avoid these adverse
consequences, regulators of legal services ought to rely upon existing
prohibitions on false, misleading, or deceptive communications and not subject
web sites to requirements applicable to traditional advertising.
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